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Abstract
We introduce a new action language, CARD, which al-
lows defeasible dynamic causal laws, default ﬂuents, concur-
rent and non-deterministic actions, and actions which use re-
sources. We give syntax and semantics of the language and
several simple examples of its use. Comparison with some
other languages is also given though limited by space require-
ments.
Introduction
Representing knowledge about dynamic domains and using
this knowledge for solving classical AI tasks (such as plan-
ning, diagnostics, and learning) have been at the center of
research in Artiﬁcial Intelligence since the late ﬁfties. One
direction of work in this area consisted of the design of ac-
tion languages - formal models of parts of natural language
used for reasoning about actions and their effects. A theory
in an action language (often called an action description) is
used to succinctly describe the collection of all possible tra-
jectories of a given dynamic domain. Usually this is done
by deﬁning the transition diagram, T(A), of an action de-
scription A. The states of the diagram correspond to possi-
ble physical states of the domain represented by A. Arcs of
T(A) are labeled by actions. A transition hσ,a,σ0i ∈ T(A)
if execution of action a in state σ may move the domain to
state σ0. In some action languages actions are elementary
(or atomic). In others an action, a, is viewed as a ﬁnite non-
empty collection of elementary actions. Intuitively, execu-
tion of an action a = {e1,...,en} corresponds to the simul-
taneous execution of every ei ∈ a. Currently there are a sub-
stantial number of action languages used to study different
features of dynamic domains. Some of them are easily com-
parable. For instance the action language AL (Turner 1997;
Baral & Gelfond 2000) is simply an extension of action lan-
guage A (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1993) by state constraints
(also called static causal laws) which express causal rela-
tions between ﬂuents1. Similarly AC (Baral & Gelfond
1997) expands A by allowing concurrent actions (which are
prohibited in A). Differences between other languages are
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1By ﬂuent we mean a function whose values depend on state
and may change as the results of actions.
far more substantial and often rooted in the choice of basic
underlying principles used in their semantics. The seman-
tics of AL, for instance, formalize McCarthy’s Principle of
Inertia which says that “Things tend to stay the same unless
they are changed by actions” (McCarthy & Hayes 1969).
This principle, suggested by McCarthy as an informal solu-
tion to the frame problem, is closely connected to the notion
of default and the notion of beliefs of a rational agent. The
semantics of the language C+ (Giunchiglia et al. 2004) is
based on a different underlying principle - The Principle of
Universal Causation. In (Giunchiglia et al. 2004) this prin-
ciple is informally summarized as follows: “Every fact that
is caused obtains, and vice versa”. Yet another basic idea
is used in the semantics of language K, introduced in (Eiter
et al. 2000). Theories of K describe “transitions among
states of knowledge rather than among states of the world”.
The list is of course incomplete and is only used to illustrate
the richness of the action language landscape. Even though
such diversity of approaches can be viewed as undesirable,
we view it as a good thing. It has already led to interesting
partial solutions of the frame, ramiﬁcation, and qualiﬁcation
problems, and the establishment of non-trivial connections
between causality, defaults, and beliefs. We consider the
further development of these languages and the study of the
relationship between them to be an important research direc-
tion. New results will sharpen our understanding of various
basic principles used in action language design and help in
developing the methodology of the use of action languages
as high level descriptions of dynamic domains needed for
design and development of intelligent systems.
In this paper we introduce a new action language CARD
which extends both AL and AC. The new language allows
defeasible dynamic causal laws, default ﬂuents, concurrent
and non-deterministic actions, and actions which use re-
sources. We give syntax and semantics of the new language
and several simple examples of its use.
Syntax
Let Σ be a sorted signature consisting of sorts2 S1,...,Sn
and properly typed function symbols. Strings from Si will
be referred to as object constants of sort Si. We assume that
2By a sort we mean a non-empty countable collection of strings
in some ﬁxed alphabet.Σ contains
• SortSe whoseelementsarecalledelementaryactions. We
also assume some ﬁxed enumeration {e1,e2,...} of Se.
• Sort Sa consisting of strings of the form {ei1,...,eik}
where 1 ≤ k and for every 1 ≤ m < k, im < im+1.
Elements of Sa are called actions3. (For instance if
Se = {e1,e2} then Sa = {{e1},{e2},{e1,e2}}. Note
that {e2,e1} 6∈ Sa.)
• Usual numerical sorts and functions including sort N =
{0,1,2,...}, functions +, ≤, etc., and a Boolean sort
Bool = {true,false};
We also assume that function symbols of Σ are divided into
two disjoint sets, called ﬂuents and statics. The arithmetic
functions belong to the latter class. Terms of Σ will be de-
ﬁned as usual. Atoms are expressions of the form t1 = t2
where t1 and t2 are properly typed terms. Atoms t = true
and t = false will be often written as t and ¬t. Atoms
containing ﬂuents are called ﬂuent atoms. Other atoms are
called static. Function symbols of Σ with exactly one of
their parameters taking values from Sa will be called action
attributes. The set of object constants of Σ is called the uni-
verse of Σ and denoted by U.
An interpretation I of Σ is a mapping I, such that
• For any object constant c of Σ, I(c) = c;
• For any function symbol f of Σ with parameters from
sortsS1,...,Sk andvaluesfromsortS, I(f)isafunction
fI from S1 × ... × Sk to S;
• For a numerical sort I must coincide with standard inter-
pretations of the corresponding function symbols.
Interpretation I is expanded to terms and atoms of Σ in the
usual manner. The truth of atom l with respect to I (I |= l)
is also deﬁned as usual. I satisﬁes a collection of atoms if
every atom of the collection is true in I. Note that since I is
standard on numerical sorts and functions, I(0) is 0, I(3+4)
is equal to 7, and I(4 > 1+1) is true in any interpretation of
Σ. In what follows we will often identify an interpretation I
with the collection of atoms of Σ which are true in I.
Deﬁnition 1 [Action Description of CARD]
An action description A of CARD consists of:
• A signature Σ(A) satisfying the above assumptions.
• A logic program Π(A), under answer set semantics (Gel-
fond & Lifschitz 1991), referred to as the static part of A.
It cannot contain ﬂuents, and is used to deﬁne relations of
the domain which hold in all its states. For simplicity we
assume that Π(A) has a unique answer set.
• A collection of statements of the form :
l0 if body (1)
default l0 if body (2)
a causes l0 if body (3)
a normally causes l0 if body (4)
impossible a if body (5)
3To simplify the presentation we often abuse notation by using
e instead of {e}.
where a is an action, l0 is a ﬂuent atom of the form t = c
where c is an object constant, and body is a collection
of atoms of Σ. l0 is often referred to as the head of the
corresponding statement.
Intuitively statement (1), called a state constraint or static
causal law, says that every state of the domain which satis-
ﬁes the body of (1) must satisfy l0. Statement (2), referred
to as a default, is similar to a state constraint, except that
it is defeasible. Statements (3) and (4) are called strict dy-
namic causal laws and defeasible dynamic causal laws re-
spectively. The former states that if a is executed in a state
which satisﬁes the body of (3) then l0 will be true in a re-
sulting state. The latter says that if a is executed in a state
which satisﬁes the body of (4) then l0 will normally be true
in a resulting state. Statement (5), called an impossibility
condition for a, says that a cannot be executed in any state
satisfying the body of (5). Intuitively, the effect of a con-
current action normally consists of the union of the effects
of its components. In case of conﬂict more speciﬁc defeasi-
ble dynamic causal laws are preferred to less speciﬁc ones.
These statements will be clariﬁed by examples below and
given precise meaning in the next section. In our presenta-
tion we will frequently use statements of CARD containing
typed variables. Such a statement will be viewed as a short-
hand for the set of all the ground instances of that statement
which respect the typing of its variables.
Let us now consider several examples of action theories
of CARD. First notice that any actions description of AL is
also an action description of of CARD. In what follows we
will focus on action descriptions of CARD not expressible
in AL.
Example 1 [Concurrent Actions]
Let action theory E1 consist of a signature with elementary
actionse1,e2, Booleanﬂuentsf,g anddynamiccausallaws:
{e1,e2} normally causes f (1)
e1 normally causes g (2)
Under the intuitive semantics of CARD the transition dia-
gram T(E1) contains transitions h{¬f,¬g},{e1},{¬f,g}i,
h{¬f,¬g},{e1,e2},{f,g}i, etc. The former is determined
by law (2) and the axiom of inertia applied to ¬f. The latter
is obtained by combining the effects of laws (1) and (2).
In what follows we often omit description of the signature
of an action theory E and assume that it consists of symbols
occurring in E.
Example 2 [Defeasibility of Dynamic Causal Laws]
Consider E2 consisting of causal laws:
e1 normally causes f (1)
e1 normally causes ¬f (2)
According to our intuitive semantics the laws behave sim-
ilarly to contradictory defaults in answer set programming
or Reiter’s default theories (Reiter 1980). Neither of the
laws is more speciﬁc than the other. Consequently T(E2)
consists of transitions h{¬f},e1,{f}i, h{f},e1,{f}i and
transitions h{¬f},e1,{¬f}i, h{f},e1,{¬f}i obtained by
applications of ﬁrst and second laws respectively. Noticethat if one of the laws were strict, then it would ﬁre and the
remaining defeasible law would be blocked. If both were
strict, then no transition would exist.
Example 3 [Concurrency and Defeasibility]
In the previous example neither of the two contrary causal
lawsismorespeciﬁcthantheother. Thesituationisdifferent
for action description E3 consisting of laws:
{e1,e2} normally causes f (1)
e1 normally causes ¬f (2)
This time law (1) is more speciﬁc then law (2). Since more
speciﬁc information is preferable, law (1) defeats law (2).
As a result T(E3) contains transitions h{¬f},e1,{¬f}i,
h{¬f},e2,{¬f}i and h{¬f},{e1,e2},{f}i, but does not
contain a transition h{¬f},{e1,e2}{¬f}i.
Example 4 [Defaults]
Let E4 consist of statements:
e normally causes f (1)
default ¬f if p (2)
default g (3)
Intuitively, the transition diagram T(E4) contains a tran-
sition h{p,¬f,¬g},e,{p,f,g}i. In the successor state, p
becomes true by inertia; f by the dynamic causal law (1)
(which, though defeasible, is stronger than default (2)); and
g by default (3).
Action description E5 from the next example describes an
action, e, which causes a ﬂuent, f, to non-deterministically
take on a value from 1 to 3.
Example 5 [Non-determinism]
Let E5 consist of statements:
e normally causes f = 1 (1)
e normally causes f = 2 (2)
e normally causes f = 3 (3)
After the execution of e the domain can move into either
state {f = 1}, {f = 2}, or {f = 3}.
The next example illustrates the use of CARD for represent-
ing knowledge about actions which manipulate resources.
Example 6 [Moving Resources]
Consider a simple scenario in which John, who initially has
5 apples, gives 2 apples to Bob. To reason about this sce-
nario we introduce a signature Σ containing sorts for names
(including John and Bob) and types of resources (including
“apples”); natural numbers will be used to measure quan-
tity of resources involved in the transaction. We use capi-
tal letters P and R for variables which range over the ﬁrst
two sorts respectively. Possibly indexed variables X and Y
range over natural numbers; E and A range over elemen-
tary actions and actions respectively. We also assume that Σ
contains a ﬂuent amount(R,P) - the number of items of re-
source R owned by a person P. The elementary action, say
e1, mentioned in the scenario belongs to a class of actions
called move resources. Syntactically move resources is an
action attribute with Boolean values. Other attributes char-
acterizing actions which move resources are origin, destina-
tion, resource and quantity. We also need static functions
net incr(A,R,P) ( net decr(A,R,P)) which return the net in-
crease (decrease) in the amount of resource R owned by
person P which is caused by the execution of action A, and
auxiliary relations, u and v deﬁned below.
E6 will consist of
• A static part including
– attribute atoms for e1:
move resource(e1) origin(e1) = john
dest(e1) = bob resource(e1) = apples
quantity(e1) = 2
– rules for u
u(E,R,P,X) ←
move resource(E), dest(E) = P,
resource(E) = R,quantity(E) = X.
u(E,R,P,0) ← not ab(E,R,P).
ab(E,R,P) ← u(E,R,P,X),X > 0.
– rules for v (similar to rules for u except dest(E) = P
is replaced by origin(E) = P).
– rules
net incr ({e1,...,ek},R,P) = Y ←
u(e1,R,P,X1),...,u(ek,R,P,Xk),
Y = X1 + ... + Xk.
net decr ({e1,...,ek},R,P) = Y ←
v(e1,R,P,X1),...,v(ek,R,P,Xk),
Y = X1 + ... + Xk.
which deﬁne net incr and net decr for every ac-
tion {e1,...,ek}. The program has a single answer
set4 containing net decr(e1,apple,john) = 2 and
net incr(e1,apple,bob) = 2.
• A set of defeasible dynamic causal laws
A normally causes amount(R,P) = Y if
amount(R,P) = Y0,
net incr(A,R,P) = Y1,
net decr(A,R,P) = Y2,
Y = Y0 + Y1 − Y2.
(6)
• A set of impossibility conditions
impossible A if amount(R,P) = Y0,
net decr(A,R,P) = Y1,Y0 < Y1.
Laws of form (6) compute the amount of resource R owned
by P after the execution of action A. The impossibility con-
dition simply says that one cannot give away more than one
has.
Execution of action e1 in the state
{amount(apples,john) = 5,amount(apples,bob) = 1}
moves the state to
{amount(apples,john) = 3,amount(apples,bob) = 3}.
4TotranslateΠ(E6)intoamoreconventionalsyntax, wereplace
any atom of the form f(x) = y by f(x,y) and add rules of the
form ¬f(X,Y2) ← f(X,Y1),Y1 6= Y2.If E6a is obtained from E6 by adding a new action:
move resource(e2) origin(e2) = mary
dest(e2) = bob resource(e2) = apples
quantity(e2) = 3
then, assuming that {e1,e2} is executable in a state σ con-
taining amount(apples,bob) = 1, the resulting state will
contain amount(apples,bob) = 6. The amounts of apples
owned by John and Mary will be appropriately decreased.
Notice that the instances of the defeasible dynamic causal
law (6) above in which A = {e1} and A = {e2} are de-
feated by the dynamic causal law in which A = {e1,e2}.
Semantics
The semantics presented in this paper maps action descrip-
tions of CARD into the corresponding transition diagrams.
Let A be an action description with signature Σ. By D(A),
S(A), and DF(A) we denote the sets of defeasible dynamic
causal laws, state constraints, and defaults of A.
Deﬁnition 2 [States of T(A)]
A state of T(A) is an interpretation, σ, of Σ such that
• For any non-numerical static atom l, σ |= l iff l belongs
to the answer set of the static part of A.
• σ satisﬁes the state constraints of A, i.e. for every state
constraint (1) of A either σ |= l0 or σ 6|= body.
Given a state, σ, a ﬂuent, f, is said to be a default ﬂuent in
σ if there is a default, “default f = y if body” ∈ A such that
σ |= body. The value, y, is called a possible default value of
f in σ. If f is not a default ﬂuent in σ it is called an inertial
ﬂuent. We deﬁne sets, σi and σd as follows:
σi = {f = y | f = y ∈ σ and f is an inertial ﬂuent in σ}
σd = {f = y | f = y ∈ σ,f is a default ﬂuent in σ, and
y is a possible default value of f}
We say that action b is prohibited in state σ if A contains an
impossibility condition (5) such that a ⊆ b and the body of
(5) is satisﬁed by σ.
To deﬁne transitions of T(A) we use a modiﬁcation of
the McCain-Turner equation from (McCain & Turner 1995).
Given an action description A, states σ and σ0, and action a:
E(a,σ,A) = {l0 | ∃a0,l0,body((a0 causes l0 if body) ∈ A
or (a0 normally causes l0 if body) ∈ A)
and a0 ⊆ a and body ⊆ σ}
We say that hσ,a,σ0i satisﬁes the extended McCain-Turner
equation for A if
σ0 = CnS(E(a,σ,A) ∪ (σ ∩ σ0
i) ∪ σ0
d) (7)
where CnS(X) is a minimal set of atoms containing X
which satisﬁes all the constraints in S(A).
Action a is called regular with respect to A and σ if
1. a is not prohibited in σ;
2. there is a state σ0 such that hσ,a,σ0i satisﬁes equation (7).
It is easy to see that both actions e1 and {e1,e2} from exam-
ple 1 are regular with respect to any state and E1. The case is
similar for action e1 from example 3 and e from example 4.
Clearly actions e1 from examples 2, {e1,e2} from example
3, and e from example 5 are not regular with respect to their
respective action descriptions and any state. In example 6,
so long as they are not prohibited in a state, either e1 or e2
alone is regular with respect to that state and E6a, however
{e1,e2} is never regular.
The effect of an action a, which is regular with respect to
σ and A, consists of the union of the effects of its compo-
nents, i.e. hσ,a,σ0i ∈ T(A) iff it satisﬁes (7).
To deﬁne a transition hσ,a,σ0i for a non-regular action
a we drop some defeasible statements (defeasible dynamic
causal laws and defaults) of A responsible for this irregular-
ity. Here are the necessary deﬁnitions.
Two defaults with the same body, and heads f = y1 and
f = y2 such that y1 6= y2 are called complementary. Given
a set of defaults, X, ψ(X) is the set of all sets of defaults
obtained by replacing each default in X by a complementary
default.
Deﬁnition 3 [Reduct]
Given an action description, A, an action, a, and a state, σ,
let X ⊆ D(A) ∪ DF(A) and T ∈ ψ(DF(X)) be such that
1. a is regular with respect to (A \ X) ∪ T and σ.
2. there is no X0 ⊂ X and T0 ∈ ψ(DF(X0)) such that a is
regular with respect to (A \ X0) ∪ T0 and σ.
Action description, R = (A\X)∪T will be called a reduct
of A with respect to a and σ.
If an action, a, is regular with respect to a state σ and an ac-
tion description A, it can easily be seen that the only reduct
of A with respect to a and σ is A itself. Notice that for an ar-
bitrary state, σ, actions from examples 2, 3, 5, and 6 are not
regular: E2 from example 2 has two reducts, R1 = {(1)}
and R2 = {(2)} with respect to e1 and σ; E3 from exam-
ple 3 also has two reducts, R1 = {(1)} and R2 = {(2)}
with respect to {e1,e2} and σ. In example 5, there are 3
reducts with respect to e and σ, each containing only one of
the three rules. Finally, in example 6, if action {e1,e2} is
executable in σ, there are 3 reducts of E6a with respect to
{e1,e2} and σ, each containing a different single instance
of dynamic causal law (6) - R1 in which A = e1, R2 where
A = e2, and R3 where A = {e1,e2}.
As discussed in the previous section, intuitively the two
reducts from E2 are equally good. Similarly, any of the three
reducts from example 5 have equal preference. Reduct R1
of E3 is preferred to R2 because law (1) is more speciﬁc than
law (2). By the same argument, R3 is the preferred reduct of
E6a. These notions are captured by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 [Preferred Reduct]
• LetR1 andR2 bereductsofAwithrespecttosomeaction
a and state σ. We say that R1 is preferred to R2 if for
every d2 ∈ D(R2 \ R1) there is d1 ∈ D(R1 \ R2) such
that d1 is more speciﬁc than d2, i.e. the action in d2 is a
proper subset of the action in d1.• A reduct, R, of A with respect to a and σ is called pre-
ferred if no reduct of A with respect to a and σ is pre-
ferred to it.
One can check that the intuitive preferences given for
reducts of our examples match those given by the deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 [Transitions of T(A)]
Let σ and σ0 be states of T(A). A transition hσ,a,σ0i ∈
T(A) iff
• a is not prohibited in σ;
• there is a preferred reduct R of A with respect to a and σ
such that hσ,a,σ0i satisﬁes equation (7) for R.
In examples (1 – 6) we used informal reading of our laws to
construct some transitions of the corresponding diagrams.
Deﬁnition 5 can be now used to justify these constructions.
The following theorem can be useful for understanding
the semantics of CARD.
Theorem 1
Let A be an action description of CARD which does not
contain strict dynamic causal laws. For any state σ and ac-
tion a which is not prohibited in σ there is at least one state
σ0 such that hσ,a,σ0i ∈ T(A)
Comparisons with other languages
In this section we compare CARD with several other action
languages. A more complete comparison will be given in
the full paper.
CARD, AL, and AC
CARD borrows some of its ideas from AL and AC. It ex-
tends AL by allowing: 1) concurrent actions in dynamic
causal laws; 2) defeasible dynamic causal laws; and 3) de-
faults and non-boolean ﬂuents. An action description which
does not use these extensions will deﬁne the same transition
diagram under the semantics of both CARD and AL.
AC differs from CARD in that AC doesn’t have static
causal laws, defaults, or non-boolean ﬂuents. Moreover, if
normally causes in CARD is translated as causes in AC,
transition diagrams of action descriptions from the examples
1 and 3 are the same under both semantics. However, under
the semantics of AC the transition diagram for example 2
has no transition labeled by e1 - the dynamic causal laws
behave like strict laws of CARD in this case.
CARD and C+
TherearesomepurelysyntacticdifferencesbetweenCARD
and C+. Heads and bodies of the laws of C+ allow arbitrary
formulas while those of CARD are limited to atoms. Some
causal laws of C+ are simply not allowed in CARD, etc.
These differences are not essential. If needed the syntax of
CARD can be extended to make it more compatible with
C+. Important semantic differences between CARD and
C+ are inherited from differences between C+ and both AL
and AC. Even though action descriptions of AL can, syn-
tactically, be viewed as action descriptions of C+ these lan-
guages are based on different underlying assumptions and
can differ in meaning. For instance in AL, a state constraint
f if f (8)
is trivially satisﬁed by any state, hence, its addition to an
action theory A of AL does not change A’s meaning. This
is not the case for C+’s counterpart to (8) which is read as
“if f is true then there is a cause for this” which can be
interpreted as assigning default value true to f.
Differences between AC and C+ stem from the different
interpretations of dynamic causal laws. In C+, causal law
e1 causes f
implies that the effect, f, of e1 holds after any event which
involves execution of e1, even if other actions are executed
concurrently. This is different from AC where this law is
defeasible and can be defeated by, say,
{e1,e2,e3} causes ¬f
To achieve the same effect in C+ one may write
e1,¬e2 causes f
e1,¬e3 causes f
e1,e2,e3 causes ¬f
In (Giunchiglia & Lifschitz 1998) the authors show two
ways in which action descriptions of AC can be encoded in
C+. The precise relationship between these encodings and
our approach will be investigated in the full paper.
There are several substantial differences between CARD
and C+ which are not inherited from older languages. One
stems from a difference in the defeasible dynamic causal
laws of each language. In C+ there is no preference given
to more speciﬁc laws. Let E0
3 be an action description of
C+ obtained from E3 by replacing normally causes by may
cause. If action {e1,e2} is performed in an arbitrary state,
E0
3 yields two transitions while E3 only yields one. CARD
and C+ also differ by the means of defeating defaults incor-
porated in their semantics. In C+ a default can be defeated
only by another statement with the conclusion contrary to
that of the default, as in example 4 or in the following:
Example 7 [Conﬂicting Defaults]
Let E7 consists of
e causes h (1) default f (2)
default g (3) ¬f if g (4)
Under the semantics of CARD if e is executed in any state,
regardless of the truth values of f, g, and h, rules 1, 3, and
4 ﬁre and state {g,h,¬f} is the result. The same behavior
will be exhibited by C+.
The situation changes when defaults are defeated “indi-
rectly”, as for instance in
Example 8 [Indirectly Conﬂicting Defaults]
Let E8 consists of
e causes h (1) default f (2)
default g (3) ¬r if f (4)
r if g (5)
This time the transition diagram of E8 deﬁned by the se-
mantics of C+ does not have a transition labeled by e. Un-
der the semantics of CARD for any σ the diagram has
two suchtransitions with successorstates{h,f,¬g,¬r}and
{h,¬f,g,r} respectively.Another difference is related to the treatment of actions
dealing with resources. The causes construct of C+ is not
directly applicable to describing effects of concurrent exe-
cution of such actions. To remedy this problem (Lee & Lif-
schitz 2003) introduces the notion of additive ﬂuent and a
new syntactic construct, increments. A new law,
e increments c by n if p
says that the execution of action e in a state satisfying p will
increment the amount of resource, c, by n. Formalization of
example 6 in C+ will look as follows:
Example 9 [Moving Resources in C+]
Consider an action description of C+5 in which actions e1
and e2 are deﬁned as in example 6, ﬂuent amount(R,P) is
declared as additive, and causal laws are of the form:
E increments amount(R,P) by N if
move resource(E),
resource(E) = R,
dest(E) = P,
quantity(E) = N.
E decrements amount(R,P) by N if
move resource(E),
resource(E) = R,
origin(E) = P,
quantity(E) = N.
The transition diagram deﬁned by this action description dif-
fers from that deﬁned in example 6 only by static expres-
sions formed by net incr and net decr. Note however that
CARD’s formalization uses a standard construct of causes.
Moreover, dealing with resources in CARD is not limited to
addition.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we introduced a new action language CARD
which allows representation and reasoning with defeasible
dynamic causal laws, default ﬂuents, concurrent and non-
deterministic actions, and actions which use resources. The
language substantially expands the expressive power of its
predecessors, AC and AL. In some respects it is even
more powerful than C+. In the full paper6 we discuss the
methodology of using CARD for knowledge representation
and illustrate this methodology using several larger exam-
ples. Our current research plans include careful investiga-
tion of the relationship between CARD and other languages
such as C+ and the languages from (Shoham 1990), (Er-
dem & Gabaldon 2006), and (Zhang 2003). We also plan to
expand CARD by continuous processes, similar to that in
(Chintabathina, Gelfond, & Watson 2005) and to investigate
mapping of action descriptions of CARD into CR-Prolog
(Balduccini & Gelfond 2003) - an extension of Answer Set
Prologcapableofreasoningwithcomplexcontradictionsbe-
tween defaults. Long term plans include the development
and implementation of a modular version of CARD.
5We consider a version of C+ which allows description of ac-
tions and their attributes by atomic formulas.
6The full paper will be posted at www.krlab.cs.ttu.edu/papers
upon it’s completion.
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